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ABSTRACT
Although social scientists, journalists, and tv presenters have made great efforts to
justify the relevance and importance of audience discussion programmes, these
programmes have been commonly labelled as “trash television”. Among the most
frequent criticisms in the literature are the accusations that these programmes turn
serious matters into sensationalist spectacle and indulge emotional outbursts while
pretending to offer some kind of public service. The point of departure for the
present paper is that a linguistic analysis of conflict talk in an institutional context
may throw light on the insights offered by these programmes. More precisely, the
present paper argues that conflict talk in an institutional context can build
normative legitimacy by exemplifying values and moral obligations – as can be
seen in the topics and guests selected for each programme. All in all, this study
suggests that conflict talk is not only used as an ideological vehicle for attitude
change, but that it also exerts a powerful  force of social cohesion on the audience.
1. Introduction
Although research on conflict has been extensive in distinct fields (Hutchby, 1996a and
1996b; Myers, 2001; Wood, 2001, among others), most disciplines such as philosophy,
sociology, psychology and linguistics have traditionally viewed conflict in a negative manner
(Vuchinich, 2003a and 2003b). As a result, conflict has generally been undervalued
(Vuchinich et al., 2002; Grimshaw, 1990) and we were urged to eradicate both at school and
at home what psychologists wrongly named instances of diseased communication (García
Gómez, 2007). 
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Researchers seem to have ignored the fact that anger, disagreement and conflict must be
seen as part of the daily fabric of life and something that is routinely negotiated in a society
(Hutchby, 1996a and 1996b). For instance, anger has traditionally been contrasted with
rational thought (Ellis, 2001). However, negative emotions and their expression are an
integral part of routine life and serve various functions (Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein, 1987).
Even at the risk of making a platitudinous large-scale social and cultural generalisation, I
might get little argument if I simply asserted that incivility seemed to be on the increase. We
live in a polarised culture in every sense. Television programmes show an alarming number
of viperous tongues that not only gratuitously blame groups for their plight but which also
seem to incite incivility in the audience. Examples of  family indiscretions on talk shows
(Gregori Signes, 2000 and 2001; Rama Martinez, 2003) and negative political campaigns
(Willock, 1994; O'Keeffe, 2006) flood British television and demonstrate that little is sacred
at the present time. 
The present paper moves away from a destructive, disruptive description of conflict talk
by examining the actual features of this particular type of interaction from a psychological
discursive stance. In this context, I here use the term conflict talk to refer to the overt
“disagreement between those interactants who see incompatible goals and potential
interference in achieving these goals” (Putnan, 2001: 11). With this definition, conflict is
characterised by its mixed motive nature as entailing both cooperation and competition. As
Donahue (2001: 21) states:
Individuals perceive that they want different things and generally impose competitive motives on
others. Yet they realise that extremely contentious, coercive behaviour may not fulfil their needs
efficiently. So they must communicate somewhat cooperatively.
In accordance with this quotation, I understand emotions arising from a verbal duel to be
either positive or negative in their valence. In doing so, this paper contributes to this nascent
literature which reacts against the little attention, or underestimation, that so complex a
phenomenon has received (Grimshaw, 1990). More precisely, this study moves away from an
isolated cognitive stance and focuses on issues that combine the detailed analysis of the
expression of one particular emotion – anger – in talk show conflictual episodes. In particular,
the analysis deals with the intersection of discursive psychology and anger; that is, how anger
gets coded as an engaged discursive social activity in talk show interaction. 
In this paper, I begin with introductory comments on speech act theory, followed by
characterisation of my approach to the study of persuasive discourse in talk show conflict talk.
From here, I move into the discursive psychological analysis of persuasion and (in-) civility
and make the argument that anger expression and persuasion in public discourse must be
interpreted as a combination of two key elements: discourse analysis and cognitive
interpretation. Finally, I reflect on whether anger expression and persuasion in conflictual talk
show interaction can solely be interpreted as an act of “incivility” or whether, on the contrary,
it fulfils a public service.
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2. A discursive psychological conceptual framework of persuasive discourse
In contrast to the emphasis upon cognitive issues and in line with discursive psychologists
(Edwards, 2000; Dickerson, 2001; García Gómez, 2009), this paper argues that persuasion
is a dynamic process where discourse plays an important role. My stance, therefore, draws
upon the conversation analytic emphasis on language not as a system of information but as
talk-in-interaction (Sacks, 1992; Schegloff, 1995; Thornborrow, 2001a and 2001b; Rama
Martínez, 2003; Lorenzo-Dus, 2005). Discursive psychologists agree that the unit of analysis
can be talk-in-interaction (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Heavily indebted to Sacks (1992), I
here suggest that rather than our seeking to trace a presumed cognitive causal essence beneath
persuasive discourse in talk show conflictual episodes, this particular type of discourse can
be sensitively laid open.  The fact that talk-in-interaction has been the neglected heart of Social
Psychology has been the origin of different studies which challenge the crude mechanistic
foundations of Social Psychology (Edwards and Potter, 1992; Potter, 1997; Dickerson, 1999).
In this line of thought, García Gómez (2007) demonstrates that guests exploit different
positive and negative politeness strategies in order to build up different social identities which
can clearly show intricate orientation to the particulars of the conversational context. 
The perspective adopted leads to the claim that this orientation is not surface veneer
beneath which the real individual-cognitive business of persuasion takes place but, rather, it
is the overt business of defending self-face behaviour as well as attacking the other's face
behaviour (Donahue, 2001). In Shotter's words (1993: 17), “we must cease thinking of the
`reality´ within which we live as homogenous, as everywhere the same for everyone. Different
people in different positions at different moments will live in different realities”.   
Discursive Psychology derives its conceptual framework from ethnomethodology and
conversation analysis and, therefore, it has its cornerstone in the pragmatical theory of speech
acts (Donahue, 2001). I here assume that the reader is familiarised with Speech Act Theory.
In brief, Austin's theory (1962) attempts to do justice to the fact that although utterances are
information-conveying units, social beings convey more  than their words encode. Even
though speech act theory has mainly concentrated on isolated utterances, especially those
made in spontaneous conversations and institutional settings (Gregori-Signes, 2000; Martínez
Rama, 2003), speech acts should be understood as a broader concept which concerns different
types of language use (Alston, 2000). 
In line with van Eemeren and Grootendorst's (1984 and 1992) and Antaki's (1994) theory
of speech acts in argumentative discourse, this study approaches television persuasive
discourse and anger expression as an interactive concept rather than as a personal
characteristic. In Antaki's (1994: 164) words we have “the rhetorical truism that an argument
happens in an argumentative discussion – that it is an exchange of views over a difference of
opinion; that the arguer means to defend a standpoint and the audience to attack it; and that
they both want to resolve the dispute”. What is at stake here is an understanding of treating
“persuading” as a linguistic unit and weaving persuasion and anger expression into the fabric
of speech acts. Finally, detailed inspection of the data confirms Antaki's claim that arguing is
the illocutionary act (Antaki, 1994: 166) – the communicative side of a verbal dispute –  and
persuading is the perlocutionary outcome.” In this sense, the perlocution of conflicting is the
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sum of all the felicity conditions of argument being met.
3. Data collection and participants
The sample of data is based on the video-tape recording and transcription of one of the most
popular talk shows on British Television: Kilroy. The total number of programmes is fifteen
and together they add up to around 180,000 words. For the sake of space, the total number of
extracts used to illustrate the different persuasive strategies is four. Kilroy is quite an open-
format show. Contrary to most talk shows, Kilroy does not have a strict agenda that has to be
followed step by step. Once the topic is introduced by the presenter and some guests are asked
directly to make comments on their own experiences, long stretches of the programme
interaction are developed by the guests' free contributions to discourse. In short, the basic
structure is not that of presenter's questions and guests' answers, but rather it is common to
establish a free dialogue among all the guests. With regard to representing the talk in written
form, I have chosen to transcribe the conversations in a way that is not only faithful to the
spontaneity and informality of the talk, but is also accessible to readers who are not familiar
with conversational literature or phonological / prosodic symbols.
The final corpus contained 89,937 annotated utterances from fifteen programmes that
were highly confrontational. Following García Gómez' (2007 and 2009) conversational
analysis of talk show conflict talk, every utterance has been coded for its pragmatic meaning.
Taxonomy of Speech Acts in conflictual episodes Instances Percentage
Elicit: asking for information 12,943 14.3911 %    
Elicit: commitment to a future course of action           7,539 8.3825 %
Elicit: agreement with own point of view           1,297 1.4421 %
Elicit: clarification of opponents' point of view           5,274 5.8663 %
Elicit: confirmation of opponent's point of view           3,992 4. 4386 %
Elicit: commitment to course of action due to agreement with
speaker's point of view
          3.267   3.6325 %
Directive: imposition of a course of action on the opponent           5,498 6.1131 %
Directive: suggestion of a course of action for the opponents' benefit           6,569 7.3040 %
Directive: threat directed to the opponent           9,246 10.2805 %
Directive: warning directed to the opponent           5,398 6.0019 %
Informative: direct positive self-evaluation           2,576 2.8642 %
Informative: indirect positive self-evaluation           4,586 5.0991 %
Informative: direct negative self-evaluation           1,395 1.5510 %
Informative: indirect negative self-evaluation           1,004 1.1163 %
Informative: direct positive evaluation of the opponent           2,678 2.9776 %
Informative: indirect positive evaluation of the opponent           1,837 2.0425 %
Informative: direct negative evaluation of the opponent         12,295 13.6706 %
Informative: indirect negative evaluation of the opponent           3,569 3.9683 %
Total         89,937 100%
Table 1. Taxonomy of speech acts found in the corpus 
and the frequency of each pragmatic meaning of utterances. 
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4. Self-construal, facework, and conflict styles in TV persuasive discourse
The persuasion complex itself, at the centre of the interaction, is made up of elicitations,
directives and informatives of various kinds. In addition, most of these turns are produced by
self-selection and present a high degree of overlapping and interruption, due to the fact that
each participant is likely to take any opportunity to express their own ideas; that is, each has
strong reasons to be in the speaker's role. 
In television persuasive discourse, the negotiation of two opposing points of view is
embedded in a complex social interaction of face work acts (Pérez de Ayala, 2001; Lorenzo-
Dus, 2005). The present paper analyses the exploitation of politeness strategies involved in
elicitations, directives and informatives in television conflict talk, and takes a step further by
combining a pragmatic stance with a psychological discursive analysis of speech acts. This
in turn will throw further light on how language plays a major role in constructing the
participants’ social identities. What is suggested here is that the particular persuasive
strategies behind television conflict talk can build normative legitimacy by exemplifying
values and moral obligations. Furthermore, this study suggests that conflict talk is not only
used as an ideological vehicle for attitude change, but that it also exerts a powerful force of
social cohesion on the audience.
As discussed in earlier work (García Gómez, 2007), persuasive discourse is concerned
with identity message behaviour; that is, with the individual's sensitivity toward the other's and
self's reputation, or with projected images that each party wishes to have validated in the social
interaction with the other (Rogan and Hammer, 1994; Hammer, 2001). Close inspection of
the data has revealed that persuasive discourse and identity message behaviour in talk show
conflict talk can be usefully classified into three types of face work act – two of which cluster
around self-face behaviours and one of which centres on both self-face and other-face
behaviours. 
4.1. Persuasive discourse in TV interaction: Defending self-face behaviours
These behaviours are self-focused messages that are face honouring in nature and guard
against possible future attack messages from the other party. Although there are instances of
directives, this persuasive strategy is mainly realised by means of elicitations and
informatives. They are polemical expressions based on fear, anxiety and anger which reflect
how the speaker attempts to attract the notice of the presenter and the audience in order to
convince the opponent. The strategy is polemical in so far as it involves a complex reaction
pattern involving experiential, behavioural, and physiological elements, by which the
individual attempts to deal with a personally significant matter or event (Arbib and Fellous,
2004: 15). Furthermore, there is a fine line between persuasion and anger expression in the
development of these particular conflictual episodes. Table 2 shows the distribution of speech
acts in this persuasive strategy.
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Distribution of speech acts in corpus Ratio Distribution of speech acts in
corpus
Ratio
Elicit (1): asking for information
9.2
Directive(10): warning directed to
the opponent  1.2
Elicit (2): commitment to a future course
of action 6.9
Informative (11): direct positive
self-evaluation 2.7
Elicit (3): agreement with own point of
view 9.1
Informative (12): indirect positive
self-evaluation 14.6
Elicit (4): clarification of opponents'
point of view 3.5
Informative (13): direct negative
self-evaluation 1.3
Elicit (5): confirmation of opponent's
point of view 6.8
Informative (14): indirect negative
self-evaluation 0.7
Elicit (6): commitment to course of action
due to agreement with speaker's point of
view
6.2
Informative (15): direct positive
evaluation of the opponent 5.2
Directive (7): imposition of a course of
action on the opponent 0.2
Informative (16): indirect positive
evaluation of the opponent 2.4
Directive (8): suggestion of a course of
action for the opponents' benefit 0.9
Informative (17): direct negative
evaluation of the opponent 17.1
Directive (9): threat directed to the
opponent
0.3 Informative (18): indirect negative
evaluation of the opponent 11.7
Total 100
Table 2. Distribution of Speech Acts in Defending Self-face Behaviours.
First, as a glimpse of the kinds of phenomena under analysis, consider these utterances from
an episode of Kilroy, in which Woman 14 and Woman 15 talk about Man 1. It is snippet from
M1's story about the events leading up to his break-up and the beginning of a new loving
relationship:
Extract 1: Left after a long marriage
170 W14 let me say (.) it's NOT RIGHT to carry on with the other person but (.) at the same time (.) it seems
to me the time you have had abroad (.) you had very little contact with the wife at home (.) to know
what was going on and (.) you know (.) if you still felt something for her (.) I am sorry=
171 W15 =I'm sorry for you (.) I'm sorry (.) you should have worked at your marriage and sort it out (.) tried
to find out what's gone wrong (.) you should have communicated (.) more (.) erm (.) rekindled her
love in some way
172 M1 I loved her to pieces but there was NO WAY I could sort it ] out (.) I fell in love with somebody else
(.) I couldn't help it (.) I am just responsible for my feelings (.) there was nothing I could do (.) I fell
in love
173 W15 ]you should have divorced her then (.) I'm sorry but that's the way I think=
174 M1 =it's better for the children to have two parents (.) right]
175 W15 ]two parents that are not arguing (.) I don't think this is helpful to the child] you should
176 M1 ]that's easier]
177 W15 ]you were selfish (.) you just satisfied your most basic instincts (.) you should have divorced her (.)
you should have been straightforward (.) that's what she has done to you if she had fallen in love with
another man
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If we accept language as a social construct, we must also accept the existence of such generic
activity as indicative of some social cohesiveness or collectivity (O'Keeffe 2006: 27). In the
extract above, W14 and W15 provide, as part of their narrative, a time and place for, and
specification of, M1's emotions when they hear about his affair with another woman when he
was still married. Both female guests are sorry for him but the presence of modal verb “Should
+ socially acceptable action”  characterises M1's reaction as irrational and emotional. 
Both M1 and W15 describe the same event – the fact of being with another person when
you are still married – as an emotional behaviour. On the one hand, M1 describes this
emotional behaviour as a passive reaction, and denies his agency in this socially inacceptable
behaviour (Turn 172: “I fell in love with somebody else (.) I couldn't help it (.) I am just
responsible for my feelings (.) there was nothing I could do (.) I fell in love”). This fails to
convince W15 as she perceives the same event as a controllable action where M1 had an
emotional reaction and did not control it as he should have done “Turn 177: you were selfish
(.) you just satisfied your most basic instincts (.) you should have divorced her (.) you should
have been straightforward (.) that's what she has done to you if she had fallen in love with
another man”). The strategy is likely to fail as it is based on the dichotomy between how
someone felt and what he or she did about it; on the notion of controlling one's passion,
physical violence, etc. Furthermore, the failure is emphasised by the fact that the same reality
is negotiated from two irreconciliable points of view: natural action versus moral action
(Donahue, 2001). As seen in the example above, M1 conceptualises an unfaithful relationship
as unconscious whereas W15 depicts the same situation as a moral issue which encapsulates
a negative social judgement.
In brief, communication in this relational condition includes factual information
(confessing an infidelity or a drinking problem), sharing (speaking about private issues),
attempts at bolstering one's own position and credibility (giving proper reasons for what one
did), and messages about termination and withdrawal (inability to convince the other). 
4.2. Persuasive discourse in TV interaction: Attacking and restoring self-face behaviours 
Attack self-face behaviours are statements against one's self-image. Interestingly enough,
most of the conflictive situations in the data were the result of personal threats to interactants'
own social identity (Edwards and Potter, 1992; Edwards, 2001). Linguistically speaking, this
strategy shows a disposition toward negotiating two opposing realities. Due to this process of
negotiation, guests mainly rely on informatives that express varying degrees of adhesion to
their own point of view (García Gómez, 2000). The presence of directives and informatives
can be related to ways of expressing the speaker's emotions which cover a range extending
from fear of social criticism to aggression. 
Inspection of the corpus shows that the kernel of this strategy lies in the fact that the
speaker's reasoning searches for a power balance between the interactants. Needless to say,
this strategy underlines the hypothesis that there is a fine line between persuasion and anger
expression, as the negotiation of opposing realities between speakers depends on whether
guests are able to express rationally their reasoning of a particular disputed issue statement
(Cotterill, 2003). The experiencing of anger – as a result of audience social pressure –
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prevents guests from rationally articulating their point of view and contributes to the blurring
between persuasion and anger expression (Joseph, 2004).  Table 3 shows the distribution of
speech acts in this persuasive strategy.
Distribution of speech acts in corpus Ratio Distribution of speech acts
 in corpus
Ratio
Elicit (1): asking for information
37
Directive(10): warning
directed to the opponent  9
Elicit (2): commitment to a future
course of action 5
Informative (11): direct
positive self-evaluation 104
Elicit (3): agreement with own point of
view 58
Informative (12): indirect
positive self-evaluation 176
Elicit (4): clarification of opponents'
point of view 48
Informative (13): direct
negative self-evaluation 119
Elicit (5): confirmation of opponent's
point of view 43
Informative (14): indirect
negative self-evaluation 72
Elicit (6): commitment to course of
action due to agreement with speaker's
point of view
23
Informative (15): direct
positive evaluation of the
opponent
44
Directive (7): imposition of a course of
action on the opponent 7
Informative (16): indirect
positive evaluation of the
opponent
36
Directive (8): suggestion of a course of
action for the opponents' benefit 47
Informative (17): direct
negative evaluation of the
opponent
129
Directive (9): threat directed to the
opponent 16
Informative (18): indirect
negative evaluation of the
opponent
47
Total 100
Table 3. Distribution of Speech Acts in Attacking and restoring self-face behaviours.
In extract 2, a couple responds in turn to the presenter's invitation to provide some historical
background to W2's drinking problem. W2 starts by expressing her shame of what she has
become because of her drinking problem (Turn 68: “I'm ashamed of what I am”). As the
extract shows, guests seem to have a motive to evaluate their own social category membership
negatively. This is achieved through social comparison between ingroup (negative evaluation)
and outgroup (positive evaluation). In evaluating their own ingroup negatively, interactants
attempt to exit from the group and guarantee their acceptance in the outgroup – the one that
is socially accepted amd positively evaluated (Hogg and Vaughan, 1995).
Extract 2: Standing by an alcoholic partner
67 K what do you feel about your kids↑ 
68 W2 I love them too (.) I’m ashamed of what I am=
69 K =okay (.) what do you think you are doing to the kids↑ what should we do about it?
70 W2 well (2.7) ((sights)) they both love me(.) they keep telling me they love me (.) they don’t want
us to split up
71 K then you know when they say that (.) they are telling the truth=
Don't Get Mad, Get Persuasive! 87
72 W2 =oh (.) yeah
73 M1 STOP PRETENDING you’re the victim (.) we are the victims
74 K talk to her
75 M1 stop drinking or I’ll leave you and you’ll never ever see me or the kids again
76 W2 that’s not the way]
77 M1 this is my last word
78 K you know (.) they love you 
[…]
113    W2 it’s easier said than done
114    M3 it can be done]
115    W2 ]you just don’t understand (.) I can’t put up with it any longer (.) I know I’m an alcoholic (.)
and I would like to have my life back but (.) I’m not myself any more (.) I have tried and tried
but then I find myself drinking (.) I have no control over myself (.) you’ve seen me]
116    M1 ]you can decide now to stop drinking
117    W2 it’s not so easy (.) alcohol is an illness (.) alcohol makes me be nasty (.) aggressive] but
118    M1 ]all you have to do is to sacrifice the bottle
119    W2 you can’t understand (.) the bottle is controlling my life and I can’t do anything to avoid it (.) I
am not to blame (.) I’m a wreck now alcohol controls me
120    M1 everything I said is with good intent ‘cos I am thinking of the best for you and our family
121    W2 stop it (.) I can’t put up with this rubbish any longer (.) day after day (.) you pestering me (.)
can’t you see I’m ill (.) it doesn’t seem to matter to me o::r it doesn’t stop me (.) I have many
health problems (.) you know what I’m saying is true (.) I have been in hospital no end of times
(.) my GP said the other day when I spoke to him (.) he didn’t think I would make it to
Christmas (.) I have lost so much weight (.) I mean (.) my trousers are falling off me because of
the BOOZE a::nd not eating properly (.) and THAT STILL DOESN’T STOP ME=
122 M1 =I love you (.) can’t you see that (.) you can’t imagine how much it hurts to see how the
person you love is killing herself and ruining the life of their family (.) I will never be sick of
saying (.) you can stop drinking (.) you're mad (.) you can't see you will lose everything ] you
love
123 W2 ]there’s nothing I can do (.) alcoholism is an illness (.) help is all I ask]
124 K ]are you prepared to help your wife8
125 M1 I’ll try (.) listening to her and all these people saying (.) alcoholism is an illness has helped me
to understand that my wife may be ill 
126 K what should he do8
Extract 2 is an example of inclusive alignment within the participation framework. The
guests are aligned with the presenter and each other. Then the presenter, using the pronoun
'we' (Turn 69: “what should we do about it?”) pivots his alignment to include the studio and
non-studio audience and, following applause, he re-aligns so as to address all of the audience
directly. W2's depiction of her drinking problem interspersed with routine and unremarkable
arguments is found alongside with her husband's (M1) alternative account. 
On the one hand, the attention that both participants give to the effect of heavy drinking
upon their marriage is part of their factual accounting (Vuchinich, 2003a); these are offered
as long-term observations, covering many individual events, and provide the basis for a
generalised characterisation of the relationship itself (Antaki, 1994). Note the specific contrast
with what W2 characterises as routine arguments (Turn 121: “stop it (.) I can’t put up with this
rubbish any longer (.) day after day (.) you pestering me (.) can’t you see I’m ill (.) it doesn’t
seem to matter to me o::r it doesn’t stop me […]”. M1 also works up their repeated nature, but
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not as a means of normalising them (Turn 122: “I love you (.) can’t you see that (.) you can’t
imagine how much it hurts to see how the person you love is killing herself and ruining the life
of their family (.) I will never be sick of saying (.) you can stop] drinking”). In this way, M1
produces a pathologising, rather than normalising depiction of the event (Turn 122: “you're
mad (.) you can't see you will lose everything you love”).
Not only are these different and inconsistent accounts, but also the recurrent
communication failures, augmented by profound distrust and lack of understanding,
ultimately fuel the entire conflict (Turn 115: “you just don't understand"; Turn 119: “you can't
understand; Turn 121: “can't you see I'm ill”). Let us discuss these aspects in detail. The
attacking self-face behaviour strategy is based on contrasting accounts constructed precisely
in relation to an actual alternative, in that they display an awareness of that alternative. M1,
on the one hand, accuses his wife of pretending (Turn 73: “Stop pretending you're the victim
(.) we are the victim”) and presents his wife's drinking problem as the origin of all their family
problems and the cause of his decision to divorce her (Turn 118: “all you have to do is to
sacrifice the bottle” and Turn 120: “everything I said is with good intent ‘cos I am thinking of
the best for you and our family”).
On the other hand, W2 depicts her drinking as an illness which deprives her of will (Turn
115: “I'm not myself anymore […] I have no control over myself"; Turn 117: “alcohol is an
illness (.) alcohol makes me be nasty (.) aggressive […]”). In doing so, she presents herself as
a victim and a puppet in the hands of alcohol (Turn: 119: “I'm not to blame (.) I am a wreck
now alcohol controls me”). W2 attacks her self-face behaviours but denies agency in the
actions. This is her way of avoiding responsibility for being alcoholic and being aggressive.
The desire is to withdraw from the previously defined roles and create new role frameworks
to guide the relationship (Hogg and Vaughan 1995). It is the intervention of the presenter that
stops the negotiation of realities as he asks another guest to suggest what should be done to
change this situation. This guest starts narrating his own story and the episode is interrupted.
Evidence from the corpus suggests that this persuasive strategy reflects a complex mental
process and a subtle approach. As most of the conflictive situations were the result of personal
threats to interactants' social identity, participants commonly attack self-face behaviours as
a way to pave the way and create solidarity with the opponent (García Gómez, 2007). Guests
are unable to evaluate their social category membership positively (i.e. being an unfaithful
husband; having problems with alcohol, etc.) and, therefore, the relative status of inferiority
of the group constitutes a threat to the social identity of the individual group member (Hogg
and Vaughan, 1995). In these cases, if the presenter does not stop the conflictive episode,
participants supplement the persuasive strategy of attacking their own self-face behaviours
by exiting from this negatively evaluated group. In my own terms, these participants attempt
to restore their own self image by anticipating a counterargument to a potential face attack
message from the opponents. As Ellemers (1993) points out, whether an individual selects one
strategy or other depends in large parts on his or her beliefs regarding social mobility and
social change (Augoustinos and Walker, 1995). 
In Conflict Talk, social mobility refers to the belief that the group boundaries are open
rather than closed, that it is possible to leave one group and join another. Following Foucault
(1972), there is no doubt that when any participant speaks, this person is taking up a pre-
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existent subject position that is subjected to the regulatory power of that discourse (Barker and
Galasiriski, 2001). In order to exit from the group, the speaker addresses all the negative
characteristics of the ingroup trying to block the opponent as part of his or her past and
attaches all the positive characteristics of the opponent's in-group to his or her present
situation. This present-past dichotomy aims to prove the guest has changed and cannot be
condemned because of a mistake he or she made in his or her past. 
In extract 3, M1 combines this two-fold persuasive strategy as he initially attacks his own
self-face behaviour and then tries to restore his own face:
Extract 3: My inlaws don’t like me
82 K =you really love her (.) don't you8
83 M1 I do (.) yeah
84 K I can tell when she was speaking and you were looking at her (.) what are your feelings when she was
talking8
85 M1 I'm gutted (.) I'm gutted (.) as I said (.) I haven't come on here to blame her] I am not proud of what I
did (.) I have made many mistakes (.) you know (.) but as I said]
86 K ]talk to her
87 M1 I haven't come on here to blame you (.) I know you love rachel to pieces (.) you're a good mother (.)
but you are a bit overprotective (.) I would like to have had one more chance with rachel without so
much interfering (.) we two want rachel to be happy (.) don't we8
88 W2 you said that before (.) you had plenty of opportunities (.) I love my daughter (.) you love rachel (.) ok
(.) in a different way (.) I'm here to protect rachel (.) she's all I've got (.) at the end of the day (.) if I don't
think you're the right person for her (.) I'm going to say it (.) I'm going to say it (.) well]
89 M1 ]I'm the right person (.) margaret (.) I love your daughter to pieces (.) I'm sorry (.)I know I made
mistakes (.) I know I have fallen out no end of times (.) I know I  have come back and said I HAVE
CHANGED (.) but now I have (.) I have CHANGED (.) I know I was a bit of a boozer (.) I used to
hang out with lads but ] I've changed
90 W2 ]that's what I want to point out (.) I don't want her to go through life (.) without anything and YOU
spending the money on booze (.) not buying anything for her
91 M1 you know I've changed (.) a::nd (.) erm (.) I didn't spend all the money on booze (.) you're
exaggerating=
92 W2 =I'm NOT (.) andy 
93 M1 I didn't spend all the money on drinking
94 W2 you know you did
95 M1 just let me show you I've changed (.) I had a drinking problem (.) I spent our money (.) you're right (.)
but that's over (.) now I know who I am and who I want to be with (.) just let me]
96 W2 ]I don't]
97 M1 ]I know you only want to protect your daughter (.) but I love her to pieces (.) just trust me (.) now I am
proud of the man I am (.) I've changed (.) people change (1.3) all I want is another chance (.) I am not
better than anybody else but I am not the man you're saying (.) erm (.) only lord knows how much I have
suffered (.) I'm sorry for what I did (.) I cried my eyes out (.) nobody is an angel (.) now I only want
another chance (.) please] ((crying))  
98 W5 ]stop interfering ((to Margaret)) ((applause))
99 W2 oh well (.) I must accept people may change (.) we all deserve a second chance in life (.) I will step back
The statistical analysis of speech acts reflects that this persuasive strategy is mainly realised
by means of informative moves that aim at establishing three main facts that support the
success of the strategy: 
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(a) Claiming common ground. M1 clearly builds up his discourse exploiting positive
politeness strategies (Brown and Levinson, 1987) as he claims common ground by
attending to W2's wants and exaggerating approval and sympathy with his mother-in-law
(Turn 87: “I haven't come on here to blame you (.) I know you love rachel to pieces (.)
you're a good mother”). This positive politeness strategy precedes M1's complaint: W2 is
interfering. Notice how he also exploits a negative politeness strategy aimed at
minimising W2's positive and negative face threat. On the one hand, M1 grades the
negative adjective (Turn 87: “but you are a bit overprotective”) and, on the other,  he
avoids coercing W2 (Turn 87: “I haven't come on here to blame you”).
(b)  Negative depiction of past actions. Because of his drinking problems, M1 finds himself
in a group which cannot be evaluated positively in relation to other groups (i.e.
responsible partners that are aware of their rights and duties). The success of the strategy
lies in the fact of relating all these negative actions to a past mistake that has nothing to do
with the person he is at the present time. First, M1 avoids disagreement and conveys that
speaker and opponent are cooperators as both of them love Rachel  (Turn 89: “I'm the right
person (.) margaret (.) I love your daughter to pieces”). Second, there is a personal-centre
switch as M1 narrates all the mistakes he made in the past as if he were W2. Notice the
repetitive use of the structure “I know” that precedes all the negative cricitism, clearly
presupposing W2's values are the same as M1's values at present. This presupposition
manipulation aims at claiming common ground and seeking agreement with the opponent
and can also be interpreted as an attempt to prove he really has changed (Turn 89: “I know
I made mistakes (.) I know I have fallen out no end of times (.) I know I  have come back
and said I HAVE CHANGED (.) but now I have (.) I have CHANGED (.) I know I was
a bit of a boozer (.) I used to hang out with lads but ] I've changed”).
(c) Presentation of the new values that describe the speaker as belonging to a new and
socially acceptable in-group. At an individual level, M1 shows he has a positive self-
esteem through an attempt to promote a positive atmosphere where others think well of
him (Turn 97: “now I am proud of the man I am”). As Augoustinos and Walker (1995:
110) point out, an evaluation of one's self on both the personal and social levels will lead
to an explicit social comparison with other social categories (Turn 97: “I am not better
than anybody else but I am not the man you're saying”). By describing all his suffering, M1
purports to exit from the in-group that is negatively evaluated. The persuasive strategy
consists of two defining qualities, as explained in what follows. W2 is made to feel guilty
and is put in a situation where forgiving is the appropriate social thing to do (Turn 97: “I
love her to pieces (.) just trust me (.) I've changed (.) people change (1.3) all I want is
another chance (.) only lord knows how much I have suffered (.) I'm sorry for what I did
(.) I cried my eyes out (.) nobody is an angel (.) now I only want another chance (.)
please”). The effectiveness of the persuasive strategy lies, on the one hand, in the social
pressure deriving from the situational context – TV interaction. On the other, the
effectiveness has to do with the ability of M1 to put W2 in a corner and she eventually
accepts the validity of M1's membership in the group as someone who made a mistake at
some point of their life but now has changed (Turn 99: “oh well (.) I must accept people
may change (.) we all deserve a second chance in life (.) I will step back”). 
Don't Get Mad, Get Persuasive! 91
4.3. Persuasive discourse in TV interaction: Defending self face behaviours and attacking
other's face behaviours
This persuasive strategy refers to the speakers' direct challenges to the opponent and the out-
group he or she represents. Contrary to the previous strategy, the speaker accepts the negative
consequences of whatever socially reprehensible action he or she is responsible for and, in
turn, challenges the negatively valued group membership that the opponent ascribes to him
or her. Despite the valuable work by Jost (1995), the psychological and social costs of
internalised ingroup derogation have largely been ignored by social psychology. Augoustinos
and Walker (1995: 118) point out that “this internalised ingroup derrogation aims at justifying
the social system that makes it possible to produce the relative social positions of different
ingroups and outgroups”. 
Rather than bringing about a wide consensus, guests employ a forceful approach and
attempt to impose their opinion on the opponents considering that discussion of opposing
points of view has proven to be ineffective. This persuasive strategy completes one of the gaps
in the literature of Social Identity Theory as it deals with the consequences of having a positive
self-esteem and/or of defending a positive social identity at any cost.  Linguistically speaking,
guests not only look for behaviour that suggests real or potential conflict but they deliberately
provide no resolution. Being somewhat dictatorial in nature, this strategy is mainly realised
through informatives and directives. Table 4 shows the distribution of speech acts in this
persuasive strategy.
Distribution of speech acts in corpus Ratio Distribution of speech acts in corpus Ratio
Elicit (1): asking for information
37
Directive(10): warning directed to the
opponent  9
Elicit (2): commitment to a future
course of action 5
Informative (11): direct positive self-
evaluation 104
Elicit (3): agreement with own point of
view 58
Informative (12): indirect positive self-
evaluation 176
Elicit (4): clarification of opponents'
point of view 48
Informative (13): direct negative self-
evaluation 119
Elicit (5): confirmation of opponent's
point of view 43
Informative (14): indirect negative self-
evaluation 72
Elicit (6): commitment to course of
action due to agreement with speaker's
point of view
23
Informative (15): direct positive evaluation
of the opponent 44
Directive (7): imposition of a course of
action on the opponent 7
Informative (16): indirect positive
evaluation of the opponent 36
Directive (8): suggestion of a course of
action for the opponents' benefit 47
Informative (17): direct negative evaluation
of the opponent 129
Directive (9): threat directed to the
opponent 16
Informative (18): indirect negative
evaluation of the opponent 47
Total 100
Table 4: Distribution of Speech Acts in Defending self face behaviours  
and attacking other's face behaviours.
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In the following extract, M23 sends messages that protect his self-image from potential future
attack by challenging all the social conventions which members of a particular culture may
share. 
Extract  4: Slimming for summer
182 W22 is it a problem for you if the woman you love is larger than you8
183 M23 I've never been in love with one
184 W22 would you feel attracted by one8
185 M23 I don't think so
186 W22 be sincere (.) would you mind being seen in public with a large lady8
187 M23 yeah (2.3.) I]
188 W22 ]I wouldn't diet for a man like you (.) you can't judge a book by its cover (.) I'm fat but I am a
human being (.) people should take me for my personality and what I'm like inside
189 M23 I don't]
190 W22 ]what gives you the right to knock somebody's self-esteem to destroy somebody (.) emotionally
for the sake of your prejudice8 if you went up to a coloured person and said (.) I'm not going to
give you respect because you're black (.) short or have big feet (.) you are humiliating people (.)
you'd be breaking the law in some cases but because you're big (.) what gives you the right8
((applause))
191 M23 it's my opinion (.) the majority of blokes in this country agree (.) ninety percent of blokes in this
country like slim birds (.) it's as simple as that (.) and it's their opinion as well] 
192 W22 ]not necessarily (.) mr perfect=
193 M23 =it is
194 W22 don't you think it's wrong8
195 M23 no (.) it's just reality
196 W22 no (.) it isn't (.)  I think you are the most ignorant creature I've ever met (.) you should be on a
veranda playing a banjo ((applause))
197 K calm down (.) calm down
[…]
320 M23 I'd like to ask all these people that are so proud of themselves (.) why are you on a diet8 (.) Many
people don't dare to say this but (.) let's be sincere (.) at the end of the day (.) it seems to me (.) you
hate yourself and you'd like to be slim and beautiful
321 W22 you're wrong
322 M23 oh well (.) I don't think so (.) you are a bunch of liars (.) you'd like to say the truth but]
323 W22 ]because we're fat and we would like to be models (.) I prefer being as I am than being like you (.)
you don't have the right to look down upon us (.) you're worthless
324 M23 you're a bunch of liars (.) definitely (.) you're fat (.) you're ugly (.) people don't find you attractive
and that's why you're on a diet (.) admit you don't like being fat
325 W22 no (.) no (2.3) why are you so cruel8 what's wrong with you8
326 M23 nothing (.) I'm just saying  the truth (.) it's a fact (.) people want to be slim (.) stop fooling
yourself=
327 W22 =I'm not fooling ]myself
328 M23 ]yes you are (.) I don't care what people think of me (.) unless I know they're right and you admit
it or not (.) you know I'm right (.)I just say what other would like to say but they are ]afraid
329 W22 ]as the lady over there said (.) you're the most ignorant creature in this world (.) and listen to me
(.) you will end up alone in life as you deserve
330 M23 oh yes (.) but I am not fat
331 W22 you're a MONSTER
332 K calm  down (.) calm down
Don't Get Mad, Get Persuasive! 93
M23 risks his social identity on television and gives priority to his personal cost. He denies the
impositions deriving from the common demands placed upon any individual group member
by the ingroup in order to maintain ingroup cohesiveness and uniformity (Hogg and Vaughan,
1995). The persuasive strategy consits of:
(a) Challenging the established social conventions. The main defining quality of the
previous strategy is that it represents attempts by M23 as a social being to persuade his
opponents by subordinating his personal identity in favour of his social identity. As Tajfel and
Turner (1986: 19-20) suggest, this self-presentation strategy “seeks positive distinctiveness
for the in-group by redefining or altering the elements of the comparative situation”.  In the
extract, M23 challenges the established social conventions the outgroup represents (turn 320:
“I'd like to ask all these people that are so proud of themselves (.) why are you on a diet8; Turn
324: “you're a bunch of liars (.) definitely (.) you're fat (.) you're ugly (.) people don't find you
attractive and that's why you're on a diet (.) admit you don't like being fat”) and nominates
himself the speaker of a bigger group in order to support his argument (“Turn 121: it's my
opinion (.) the majority of blokes in this country agree (.) ninety percent of blokes in this
country like slim birds (.) it's as simple as that (.) and it's their opinion as well]”).
Although Hogg and Vaugham (1995) consider the possibility of having different roles in
a particular social group, these roles are determined by an intergroup behaviour “among
individuals that is regulated by those individuals' awareness of and identification with
different social groups” (Ibid.: 348). Needless to say, these roles can be understood as norms
in so far as they describe the appropriate course of action that is applied to the ingroup as a
whole. This point of view has an interesting implication in the analysis of this particular
persuasive strategy in TV interaction as this stance claims that social behaviour is
fundamentally influenced by the social categories to which we belong and power and status
relations between those social categories. However, nothing is said about what regulates
individual behaviours that seem to be regulated by the need of individuals to satisfy their needs
and defend their self face behaviour at any cost. As seen in the extract, M23  constructs
contrast between himself and the outgroup categories through talk-in-interaction (Dickerson,
1999). He depicts himself as “I'm different to you and that makes me better than you are”.
(b) Quest for individual autonomy. However, M23 is not interested in representing a
particular group and M23 goes on to contrast himself with his own group as a means of
asserting his individual autonomy (Turn 320: “Many people don't dare to say this but (.) let's
be sincere (.) at the end of the day (.) it seems to me (.) you hate yourself and you'd like to be
slim and beautiful”) and depicting himself as unique (Turn 328: “I don't care what people
think of me (.) unless I know they're right and you admit it or not (.) you know I'm right (.)I just
say what other would like to say but they are ]afraid”). M23 perceives that he wants different
things and imposes competitive motives on his opponents while ignoring common social
conventions. 
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5. Conclusions
The relation between persuasion and dissuasion is non-trivial. In this paper, an analysis of the
distinct persuasive strategies employed in TV conflict talk makes it possible to argue that,
contrary to the belief of Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorisation Theory, the act of
drawing a contrast between oneself and the others, and of negotiating information, is far from
being accomplished in a mechanistic fashion but occurs in a way which demonstrates intricate
orientation to the particulars of the talk context. 
Persuasion is therefore the overt business of constructing identity and positioning oneself
in interaction. The analysis of the data has revealed that persuasive discourse and identity
message behaviour in talk show conflict talk can be usefully classified into three types of face
work act: a) Defending self-face behaviours. This persuasive strategy is based on justifying
socially inacceptable social actions such as being unfaithful, leaving your partner behind,
bullying another, etc. The justification centres around describing a socially (in)acceptable
emotional behaviour as passive reaction whereas the opponent conceptualises the same event
as controllable action; b) Attacking and restoring self-face behaviours. This persuasive
strategy is as common as effective in talk show verbal duels. Those guests that are responsible
for reprehensible actions attempt to introduce some new comparison dimension while playing
with the past/present dichotomy. The effectiveness of the strategy lies in the fact that there is
an immense social pressure that guests use to create more and more connections with the
studio audience. The opponent can feel the social pressure and eventually conforms to what
the studio audience considers socially acceptable. In this context, this strategy can be regarded
as a conflict resolution strategy in so far as it uses persuasion as a means of achieving wide
consensus; and c) Defending self face behaviours and attacking other's face behaviours. This
persuasive strategy shows shows how the negotiation of meaning provides a central force for
the constitution of social relations. This contentious, coercive behaviour may not fulfil the
needs of the individual efficiently (Donahue, 2001).  In a talk show interaction, parties are
dependent on one another in so far as they can mutually control one another's behaviour by
relying on simple socially acceptable behaviours (e.g. drinking, leaving your wife behind, or
abandoning a child do not live up to socially acceptable standards). All in all, this study has
suggested that conflict talk is not only used as an ideological vehicle for attitude change, but
that it also exerts a powerful force of social cohesion on the audience.
Notes 
1. For transcription conventions used in the extracts, see Appendix.
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Appendix: Transcription conventions
The following conventions were developed by Gail Jefferson.
[ ] Square brackets mark the start and end of overlapping speech. Position them in
alignment where the overlap occurs
89 Vertical arrows precede marked pitch movement, over and above normal rhythms
of speech. They are for marked, hearably significant shifts – and even then, the
other symbols (full stops, commas, question marks) mop up most of that. Like
with all these symbols, the aim is to capture interactionally significant features,
hearable as such to an ordinary listener – especially deviations from a common
sense notion of ‘neutral’, which admittedly has not been well defined
CAPITALS Capitals mark speech that is obviously louder than surrounding speech (often
occurs when speakers are hearably competing for the floor, raised volume rather
than doing contrastive emphasis)
(0.4) Numbers in round brackets measure pauses in seconds (in this case, 4 tenths of a
second). Place on new line if not assigned to a speaker
(.) A micropause, hearable but too short to measure
((text)) Additional comments from the transcriber, e.g. context or intonation
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she wa::nted Colons show degrees of elongation of the prior sound; the more colons, the more
elongation
Solid.= ‘Equals’ signs mark the immediate ‘latching’ of
=We had successive talk, whether of one or more speakers, with no interval. Also used as
below (lines 3–5), where an unbroken turn has been split between two lines to
accommodate another speaker on the transcript page
